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The Performance of Compliance Measures
and Instruments for Nitrate Nonpoint
Pollution Control Under Uncertainty and
Alternative Agricultural Commodity
Policy Regimes
Nii Adote Abrahams and James S. Shortle
Following Weitzman (1974), there is ample theoretical literature indicating that choice of pollution
control instruments under conditions of uncertainty will affect the expected net benefits that can be
realized from environmental protection. However, there is little empirical research on the ex ante effi-
ciency of alternative instruments for controlling water, or other types of pollution, under uncertainty
about costs and benefits. Using a simulation model that incorporates various sources of uncertainty,
the ex ante efficiency of price and quantity controls applied to two alternative policy targets, fertilizer
application rates and estimated excess nitrogen applications, are examined under varying assumptions
about agricultural income support policies. Results indicate price instruments outperform quantity
instruments. A tax on excess nitrogen substantially outperforms a fertilizer tax in the scenario with
support programs, while the ranking is reversed in the scenario without support programs.
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Building on the seminal work of Weitzman (1974),
a small but important literature has emerged on the
choice between environmental policy instruments
when there is uncertainty on the part of environ-
mental authorities about the costs and benefits of
pollution control. Much of the literature (e.g., Adar
and Griffin, 1976; Yohe, 1978; Stavins, 1996) is
focused on the choice between emissions-based
price and quantity controls. Standard results include
the finding that the expected net benefits of optimal-
ly designed emissions price and quantity controls
will generally differ when policy makers are uncer-
tain about pollution control costs, with the difference
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depending on the relative slopes of the marginal
benefits and costs, and sign and size of the covari-
ance between marginal benefits and costs.
The emissions-based focus of this research limits
its direct relevance to nonpoint source pollution
problems since a defining characteristic of nonpoint
pollution is that emissions from individual sources
cannot be metered at reasonable cost. With unob-
servable pollutant flows, other constructs must
generally be used to monitor performance and as a
basis for the application of policy instruments (Grif-
fin and Bromley, 1982; Shortle and Dunn, 1986;
Segerson, 1988; Xepapadeas, 1995). Options for
nonpoint bases include inputs or techniques that are
correlated with pollution flows (e.g., use of polluting
inputs such as fertilizers), emissions proxies con-
structed from observations of inputs or techniques
that influence the distribution of pollution flows
(e.g., estimates of field losses of fertilizer residuals
to surface or ground waters), and ambient environ-
mental conditions (e.g., nutrient concentrations in
ground or surface waters) (Braden and Segerson,
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 33/1 (April 2004): 79S90
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1993). With these options, the choice of instru-
ments for nonpoint pollution control involves not
only a choice between price or quantity mechan-
isms (or a mixture), but also a choice between
target or bases to which they can be applied.
In this paper, we examine the choice between
alternative instruments for reducing nitrate pollu-
tion from agricultural nonpoint sources. Reducing
nitrates in ground and surface waters from agricul-
ture has emerged as a major water pollution control
policy objective (U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, 2000). The instruments considered are
differentiated according to compliance measures
(nitrate inputs, proxies for nitrate losses to the
environment) and the types of regulations applied
(prices, quantity controls). Each of these instruments
is of practical interest, with instances of their use in
the United States and Europe (Ribaudo, 2001;
Horan and Shortle, 2001; Hanley, 2001).
In addition to our interest in the implications of
uncertainty for the choice of instruments, we exam-
ine the sensitivity of environmental policy perform-
ance to other societal choices that affect welfare
effects and producer responses. Specifically, the
environmental instruments are modeled with and
without agricultural commodity and input market
distortions created by agricultural price and income
policies. Such distortions are found in many coun-
tries and are of concern for their impacts on the
environmental performance of agriculture (Shortle
and Abler, 1999). Environmental policies leading to
changes in the use of inputs and outputs that are
subject to policy distortions will affect the dead-
weight losses associated with the price and income
support policies (Lichtenberg and Zilberman, 1986).
The changes in deadweight losses will count as
benefits (if the change is negative) or costs (if the
change is positive) of the environmental policy. The
literature on second-best environmental policy
design suggests the effects of environmental policy
parameters (e.g, emissions tax rates) should be
adjusted relative to first-best settings to account for
the effects on deadweight losses associated with
market distortions (Baumol and Oates, 1988). Fur-
ther, it is plausible that effects on deadweight losses
may alter the comparative ranking of the alternative
environmental instruments.
The economic performance of alternative instru-
ments for nitrate nonpoint pollution control has
been examined in several articles (e.g., Johnson,
Adams, and Perry, 1991; Helfand and House, 1995;
Huang and LeBlanc, 1994; Shortle and Laughland,
1994; Stevens, 1988; Swinton and Clark, 1994).
However, prior empirical studies have assumed envi-
ronmental planners have perfect information about
costs and benefits. Expanding on the early work of
Weitzman, Wu (2000), and Wu and Babcock (2001)
provide theoretical guidance to the choice between
price and quantity controls for input-based instru-
ments. As with Weitzman, the generality of the
results is limited by the use of linear marginal costs
and benefits, with uncertainty affecting the inter-
cept but not the slope of these marginal functions
(Malcomson, 1978; Shortle and Abler, 1997).
Whereas prior research on the choice of instru-
ments under uncertainty is almost exclusively
conceptual, this analysis is based on a simulation
model that incorporates various sources of
uncertainty and nonlinearities, and allows for
estimation of the expected net benefits from
alternative instruments. Public uncertainty about
economic and environmental outcomes due to
imperfect information about parameters of cost
and benefit functions (e.g., input substitution
elasticities, product demand, and input supply elas-
ticities), and stochastic environmental variables is
captured by the model.
Our interest in linkages between price and in-
come policies on environmental policy performance
leads us to implement our simulation model at a
national level so as to capture the effects of envi-
ronmental policies on prices and, in turn, the dead-
weight loss of the price and income support policies.
This national-level model is not spatially explicit.
The simulation model is based on a set of assump-
tions about the structure of agricultural production,
input and output markets, the relationship between
land uses and pollution loadings, and pollution load-
ings and environmental damages. These assumptions
are primarily reflected in the level of aggregation
and functional forms. However, within the broad
structure, the robustness of our results is increased
by considering numerous possible states of nature
as defined distributions of key economic and bio-
physical parameters.
We begin with a conceptual model of the design
of input taxes, input standards, a tax on expected
emissions, and an expected emissions standard. The
design and choice between input taxes and input
quantity controls are examined in detail. The discus-
sion serves to clarify the issues addressed in this
paper and to facilitate the presentation of the
empirical simulation model. Next, the simulation
model is developed and results are presented on the
relative performance of alternative instruments
under alternative commodity policy scenarios.Abrahams and Shortle Performance of Compliance Measures for Nitrate Nonpoint Pollution Control   81
Nonpoint Policy Choices
For heuristic purposes, we consider the problem of
an environmental agency seeking to control nitrate
pollution from agriculture. A single competitive
agricultural sector is assumed (specifically, corn in
our empirical simulation) as the source of nonpoint
pollution, and production and emissions are modeled
at the industry level. Following prior research on
agricultural nonpoint pollution (e.g., Griffin and
Bromley, 1982; Shortle and Dunn, 1986; Horan,
Shortle, and Abler, 1999), environmental outcomes
are a function of inputs used in production (e.g.,
nitrogen fertilizer) and environmental conditions
influencing the formation and fate of nonpoint
emissions (e.g., weather). Because of the level of
aggregation, other spatially explicit factors are not
included. The environmental agency is unable to
observe emissions directly, but can formulate expec-
tations using a probabilistic model of the relation-
ship between input use and emissions.
It is assumed the agency has four types of instru-
ments from which it may choose. The instruments
are defined by a choice of policy target or base
(inputs or expected emissions) and the choice of
mechanism for regulating the target (taxes or quan-
tity controls). We envision the agency proceeding
as follows when evaluating the options. First, the
agency models the change in resource allocation
and the resulting social benefits and costs which
will result from a specific application of a particular
instrument. The agency has imperfect knowledge of
producers’ cost functions, commodity demands,
input supplies, and environmental damage costs,
and is therefore uncertain about effects on resource
allocation and societal benefits and costs. However,
the agency is assumed to have a well-defined infor-
mation structure consisting of the possible states of
the world and their probabilities. The agency can
therefore compute state-contingent resource alloca-
tion and social net benefit outcomes for specific
policy designs, and can compute the expected values
over the set of all possible states.
The agency’s objective is to maximize the
expected societal benefits less costs of pollution
control. The optimal design of a particular instru-
ment (e.g, a fertilizer tax) is the design that yields
the greatest increase in expected social benefits less
costs contingent on the choice of instrument. The
preferred instrument is the one that provides the
greatest expected net benefit among the four
options.
Notation is as follows:
P  r / pollution loading;
P  Q / industry output;
P  xi / production input i  (i = 1, 2, ..., m);
P  ps / price received for output;
P  pd / price paid for output;
P  wi
d / price paid for factor i;
P  wi
s / price received for factor i;
P  Ω / vector of production parameters;
P  α / vector of demand parameters;
P  g g g gi / vector of factor supply parameters for
factor i;
P  γ / vector of fate and transportation parameters;
P  κ / vector of damage cost parameters;
P )  / pollution loading function; r(x1,x2,...,xm; γ
P )  / output production Q(x1,x2,...,xm; Ω
function;
P )  / inverse demand for output; pd(Q, α
P ) / inverse supply function for factor i; w
s
i (xi, g g g gi
P )  / pollution damage cost function. D(r, κ
The agency’s uncertainty about the response of
polluters to price instruments and the economic costs
of compliance with both price and quantity instru-
ments results from imperfect information about
production technology, output demand, and input
supplies. This uncertainty is modeled by treating
the vectors Ω, α, and g g g gi (i = 1, 2, ..., m) as random
variables with known distributions from the
agency’s perspective. Regulatory uncertainty about
the benefits of the pollution control instruments re-
sults from imperfect information about the transport
and fate of pollutants, and the economic damage
caused by pollution. This uncertainty is modeled
similarly, treating γ and κ as random variables with
known distributions.
We illustrate what is meant here by state-contin-
gent changes for the cases of input taxes and
quantity controls. The agency assumes producers
maximize profits under perfect information about
input and output prices, and technology. Using our
industry-level specification of production, the state-
contingent input choices when producers are sub-
ject to input taxes solve:
(1) max
x1,...,xm
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where τi is the tax rate for factor i. Individual input
tax rates may be positive, negative, or zero depend-
ing on whether the agency seeks to discourage or
encourage particular input choices. The input de-
mand functions that solve the profit-maximization
problem are given as where x
τ
i ( ps;˜ w1,..., ˜ wm; Ω),
When subject to input ˜ w1' w
d
i % τi, i'1, 2,..., m.











s.t.: xi0 ¯ zi,( i '1,..., m),
where the set z ¯i is the regulatory standard defining
the set of acceptable input choices. The standards
may be lower bounds for pollution-control inputs or
upper bounds for pollution-increasing inputs. The
input demands that solve the profit-maximization





m; Ω;¯ z1,..., ¯ zm), i '1, 2,..., m.
cedures would be followed to obtain state-contin-
gent responses for the other types of instruments.
Given the state-continent production choices, the
optimal design of an instrument is obtained by max-
imizing the expected social value of the instrument.
If it is assumed the output and input markets are un-
distorted by agricultural price and income policies,
the optimal design of a particular instrument maxi-
mizes the expected economic surpluses accruing to
consumers, producers, and resource suppliers less
environmental damage costs (Just, Heuth, and
Schmitz, 1992). After some manipulation, the ex-
pected sum of the surpluses can be expressed as:
(3) ENB ' E m
Q(x1,...,xm;Ω)




wi(xi, g g g gi) & m
xi
0 wi(s, g g g gi) ds
& D r(@), κ ,
where the expectation is formed using the agencies’
joint probability density function for the random
variables Ω; g1, ..., gm; α; γ; and κ. Ex ante optimal
input tax rates, or input restrictions, are determined
by plugging the input demands that solve (1) for any
τi, or (2) for any z ¯i, into (3) and then choosing tax
rates or input restrictions to maximize the resulting
expression. Specifically, ex ante optimal input taxes
maximize (3) subject to ), xi' x
τ
i ( ps;˜ w1,..., ˜ wm; Ω
i ' 1, 2, ..., m. The ex ante optimal tax rate for input
xi is denoted as τi
*, and the resulting optimized ex-
pected net benefits are denoted ENBτ
*. The ex ante
optimal input restrictions maximize (3) subject to
. xi ' ¯ xi( ps; w
d
i , ..., w
d
m; Ω;¯ z1, ..., ¯ zm), i ' 1, 2, ..., m
The ex ante optimal restriction for input xi is written
as z ¯i




The difference in the expected net benefits of the
ex ante optimal input taxes and standards is ' ∆τ¯ z





search on the choice of instruments under uncer-
tainty is that it is uncertainty about polluters’
control costs which causes differences in the ex
ante efficiency of optimized price and quantity
controls (e.g., Weitzman, 1974). Accordingly, with
perfect information about polluters’ responses,
Under imperfect information about control ∆τ¯ z ' 0.
costs,  may be positive or negative. From prior ∆τ¯ z
work on the choice between emission taxes and
quantity controls, it is clear that under imperfect in-
formation little can be said a priori about  with- ∆τ¯ z
out imposing very strong restrictions on the structure
of the underlying economic and physical relation-
ships and the joint probability density function of
the random variables (Baumol and Oates, 1988;
Weitzman, 1974; Stavins, 1996; Malcomson, 1978;
Wu and Babcock, 2001; Wu, 2000).
The Simulation Model
For our empirical simulation, we use a model of corn
production in the United States and its impacts on
nitrate pollution. The model has the same general
structure as the conceptual model presented above.
This section begins with a description of the spe-
cific forms of the production, commodity demand,
input supply, pollution loading, and damage cost
functions. Uncertainty is modeled by treating param-
eters of these functions as random variables with
known distributions. The functional forms and
parameter distributions were selected to provide a
reasonable but computationally feasible represen-
tation of the problem. The remainder of the section
is devoted to the parameter distributions, solution
procedures, and other details of the implementation
of the model.
Functional Forms
The industry production function, F(x, Ω) above, is
a two-level nested constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) production function (Sato, 1967). The two-
level CES production function is parsimonious inAbrahams and Shortle Performance of Compliance Measures for Nitrate Nonpoint Pollution Control   83
parameters and is a reasonable approximation of
aggregate agricultural processes (Kaneda, 1982;
Hayami and Ruttan, 1985; Howitt, Ward, and
Msangi, 1999). The key parameters of this func-
tional form are the share parameters and elasticities
of substitution between inputs. Following Abler and
Shortle (1992), output is modeled as a function of
a composite mechanical input, M, and a composite
biological input, B. The mechanical input is a func-
tion of capital and labor. However, prices of capital
and labor are held constant in this analysis because
they are generally not affected by the agricultural
sector (Abler and Shortle, 1992). Consequently,
there will be no change in the relative price within
the nest, implying no change in the factor propor-
tions. Thus, the inputs can be aggregated into a
single input, xk. The production function is there-
fore given as:










σT is the elasticity of substitution between the
mechanical and biological inputs, A1 is a scaling
constant, and 0 < sB, sK < 1 are share parameters.
The biological input is a function of land (xL) and
fertilizer (xF), and is specified as:











σB is the elasticity of substitution between land and
fertilizer, A2 is a scaling constant, and 0 < sL, sF < 1
are the share parameters. Because this is a simulated
national production model using national averages
for various parameters, climate and other regional
variations that would affect yield are not modeled.
The inverse demand function, p
d(Q,α), is assumed
to be linear with intercept α1 and slope α2. This
specification of the demand function can be viewed
as a first-order Taylor series approximation for the
true demand function in the neighborhood of the
expansion point.
All inputs except land are assumed to be supplied
perfectly elastically. In the short run, supply
responses are not perfectly elastic, but over time
labor and resources used in capital and chemical
production can be withdrawn at relatively low cost
to nonagricultural use (Gardner, 1987; Abler and
Shortle, 1992). However, even if the long-run supply
responses are not perfectly elastic, they can be
treated as such because the elasticities are very
large (Abler and Shortle, 1992). In the context of
the model presented above, this implies Mwi
s/Mxi = 0
for all inputs except land. Land supply is specified
as a constant elasticity function of the rental rate of
land, xL = A3(wL)
g, where g is the elasticity of the
land supply and A3 is a scaling constant.
Emissions are modeled as a proportion of excess
nitrogen. Excess nitrogen is defined as applied nitro-
gen less nitrogen uptake by the plant, e = xF ! γQ,
where γ is the proportion of nitrogen removed per
bushel of corn. Following Roth and Jury (1993),
surface runoff is specified as r = β(xF ! γQ), where
β represents the proportion of excess nitrogen in
runoff. Most nitrogen damage is in the form of
runoff, but there is also some leaching. However,
given the level of aggregation of the model, the de-
tails of the fate of nitrogen cannot be fully captured.
For the sake of simplicity, damage costs are assumed
to be an exponential function of nitrogen runoff,
D ' κ2(r)
κ1.
There are no definitive studies on the costs of
nitrogen pollution or the form of a nitrogen damage
cost function. We use a functional form that has
desirable economic properties (increasing marginal
damage cost), and is parsimonious in parameters to
facilitate the computation of expected values. This
form has been used in prior studies in the design of
emissions taxes and standards under uncertainty
(Kolstad, 1986; Xepapadeas, 1991).
Environmental and Farm Policy Instruments
Our environmental instruments are taxes and stand-
ards on purchased nitrogen fertilizer, and taxes and
standards on excess nitrogen. These policies are
examined with and without corn price supports and
land retirement policies. The support polices we
consider are intended to illustrate the effect of
common types of agricultural interventions rather
than to evaluate specific policies. However, the
policies examined are analogous to those applied to
corn production in the United States prior to farm
policy reforms implemented by the 1996 Federal
Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act
(also known as the “Freedom to Farm Act”).
Specifically, the price support program is analogous
to the Deficiency Payment Program, and the land
retirement policy is analogous to the Acreage
Reduction Program (ARP). The 1996 reforms were
intended in part to wean agriculture from extensive84   April 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
government support. The more recent 2002 Farm
Bill reverses that direction.
The effect of the land retirement program is a
reduction in the supply of land (Gardner, 1992). If
L is total land supply, xL land in use, and the pro- φ |
portion of land idled in the land retirement program,
then total land supply is given as The L ' xL% φ | L.
land supply equation with the land retirement pro-




Following Shortle and Laughland (1994), the
price support program is modeled as a per unit
subsidy (s) on output. The price received for output
(ps) is therefore equal to the price paid for output
(pd) plus the subsidy.
With these specifications, a market equilibrium
for any particular parameter set and instrument
solves equations (4)S(10) in table 1 for consumer
and producer output prices, total output, profit-
maximizing input use, land supply, and the shadow
prices µ, of a fertilizer standard, or λ, of an excess
nitrogen standard, if those instruments are oper-
ative. Equation (4) defines the producer price. The
policy parameter s in this equation is zero in simu-
lations with no commodity policies and a positive
constant in simulations with commodity policies.
Equation (5) is the inverse demand function and
defines the consumer price that would clear the
market given total production. Equation (6) defines
the level of output.
Equations (7)S(9) are the first-order conditions
for profit maximization. The shadow price µ in
equation (7) is zero in simulations without the
fertilizer standard. It will be positive and an
equilibrium result of simulations with the stand-
ard. Similarly, the shadow price λ in equations
(7)S(9) is zero in simulations without the excess
nitrogen standard, and positive and an equilib-
rium result in simulations with the standard. The
fertilizer tax rate, τF, is positive in simulations
with fertilizer tax and zero otherwise. The excess
nitrogen tax rate, τe, is positive in simulations
with the excess nitrogen tax and zero otherwise.
Equation (10) is the land supply function. The
agricultural policy parameter is zero in simula- φ |
tions without commodity policies and a positive
constant in simulations with commodity policies.
Equations (11)S(13) define relationships be-
tween production choices and environmental
damages.
Table 1. Model Equations
Price Definition/Consumer Behavior:
 (4) ps ' pd % s
 (5) ps ' α1% α2Q
Production:















& (wF% τF% µ)& (τe% λ) Me
MxF
' 0,





















(11) e ' xF& γQ
Runoff:
(12) r ' β(xF& γQ)
Environmental Damages:















wi(s, gi) ds & D r(@), κ
Notes: For an input tax alone, µi, te, λ = 0; for an input standard
alone, ti, te, λ = 0; for an excess nitrogen tax alone, µi, ti, λ = 0;
and for an excess nitrogen standard alone, µi, ti, te = 0.
Model Calibration and Parameter Distributions
Public uncertainty is modeled as uncertainty by
environmental regulators about economic and envi-
ronmental parameters—specifically, the elasticity
of substitution between land and fertilizer (σLF), the
output demand elasticity (ηD), the land supply elas-
ticity (g), the damage cost function coefficient (κ1),
and the runoff coefficient (β). The uncertain param-
eters are assumed to be independent continuous ran-
dom variables with known distributions. Uniform
and normal are used in the simulations.
Moments of the production and market parame-
ters [the elasticity of substitution between land andAbrahams and Shortle Performance of Compliance Measures for Nitrate Nonpoint Pollution Control   85
fertilizer (σLF), land supply elasticity (g), and output
demand elasticity (ηD)], are derived from Abler and
Shortle (1995). Specifically, the parameters are dis-
tributed with means 1.0, 0.2, and !0.7 and standard
deviations 1.0, 0.057, and 0.3, respectively. Using
the expression σB = sBσLF + (1 ! sB)σT, the elasticity
of substitution between land and fertilizer (σB)
is calculated. Following Abler and Shortle (1995),
σT = 0.50. The slope and intercept of the inverse
demand function for output are derived as
α2 ' P
Q×ηD
and α1 ' P & α2Q,
where ηD is the elasticity of demand at the expan-
sion point (P, Q).
The uptake parameter (γ) is treated as a constant
and equal to 0.66 (National Research Council, 1993;
Abrahams, 1996). The runoff parameter (β) is
assumed to be distributed with mean of 0.60 and
variance of 0.115. This keeps the parameter within
the plausible range of zero and unity. There is little
information on the curvature of the damage function
in the literature. Peck and Teisberg (1993) found
optimal emissions control policies are more sensi-
tive to the degree of nonlinearity in the damage
function than to the scale of the damage function.
We assume κ1 to have a mean of 2 and a variance of
0.57. The marginal damage cost function therefore
varies from a constant to a cubic function.
Very little is known about the economic cost of
nitrate pollution, despite some attempts at quantify-
ing it. Smith (1992), in a survey of environmental
damage estimates, suggests it probably lies within
a range of 0.27% to 18.24% of total crop value. For
this study, damages are assumed to be 10% of total
crop value, which is about the mid-point of the
range reported by Smith. The scale parameter (κ2)
is calculated as D/κ1.
Although we assume continuous distributions of
the unknown parameters, we use discrete approxi-
mations in the simulations. This is because there is
no closed-form solution to equations (4)S(10). Con-
sequently, the net benefit function [equation (14)]
cannot be integrated directly to obtain the expected
net benefit as a function of the instrument specifi-
cations for these distributions. The approximation
is obtained using values and probabilities from
discrete approximations of the random variables.
The discrete approximations were derived using an
iterative procedure outlined in figure 1.
First, n points are selected for each random vari-
able. The points and their probabilities are selected
to preserve moments of the original distribution.
Points and probabilities for standardized distribu-
tions for this purpose can be found in Stroud and
Secrest (1966). Values for similar distributions with
different means and standard deviations can be ob-
tained by performing the same affine transforma-
tions needed to transform the standard distribution
to the desired distribution. With five random
variables, the joint probability space is 5
n. Each
element in this set implies a different realization of
the model. Because each realization is used in the
simulations (see below), the number of models we
must solve to obtain results increases exponentially
with n. Therefore, while increasing n improves the
approximation, it also increases the computational
requirements exponentially.
Next, the scale parameters (A1, A2, and A3) and
the demand parameters (α1 and α2) are calibrated so
that the solution to equations (4)S(10) with no envi-
ronmental policies operative corresponds to the
average values of the market price, production, and
input variables for the years 1989S1993, which is
the baseline equilibrium used for this analysis. This
period was selected as the baseline because of our
interest in exploring how distortionary commodity
policies can influence the comparative performance
of environmental policies. This baseline period cap-
tures the last few years of the major distortionary
corn commodity policies in the United States. The
baseline data were drawn from the U.S. Agri-
cultural Resources Model (Quiroga, Konyar, and
McCormick, 1992). The market price for corn in
this model is $2.28 per bushel, while the target
price is set at $2.75 per bushel. This implies the
subsidy per bushel is $0.47. In the time period used
for this analysis (1989S1993), farmers were required
to idle 10% of their acreage when they participated
in the Acreage Reduction Program (i.e., = 0.1). φ |
Next, the implied expected net benefit for the
benchmark equilibrium is computed as the proba-
bility weighted sum of the net benefit over the joint
probability space. We initiated this procedure with
n = 2 and tried larger values up to n = 7. There was
little change in the expected net benefit after n = 5
for both the uniform and normal distributions. This
finding suggests that the discrete approximations
with n = 5 does a reasonable job of preserving the
mean of the underlying continuous distribution. For
example, there was only about a 1% change in
expected net benefit between n = 5 and n = 7, while
the joint probability space went from 3,125 points
to 78,125. The final set of discrete points and asso-
ciated probabilities for the random parameters in







































Figure 1. Determining number of discrete points in discrete
             approximation when number of uncertain parameters = 5















0.09 !0.31 0.11 0.42 1.09 0.118
0.34 !0.38 0.15 0.49 1.46 0.239
0.69* !0.50* 0.20* 0.60* 2.00* 0.284
1.04 !0.66 0.25 0.71 2.54 0.239
1.29 !0.80 0.29 0.78 2.91 0.118
An asterisk (*) denotes variable mean.















0.04 !0.21 0.04 0.27 0.35 0.011
0.17 !0.33 0.12 0.44 1.22 0.222
0.69* !0.50* 0.20* 0.60* 2.00* 0.533
1.21 !0.75 0.28 0.76 2.78 0.222
1.78 !1.17 0.36 0.93 3.65 0.011
An asterisk (*) denotes variable mean.
Policy Simulation Procedures
A numerical procedure is used to solve for ex ante
optimal instrument values (i.e., the designs that max-
imize expected net benefits). The steps are:
1. Solve the market model for each parameter set
of the joint distribution for given tax rates or
standards and commodity program structure.
2. Calculate the net benefit for each parameter
set.
3. Construct a probability weighted average of
outcomes for each tax rate or standard. This
generates a set of expected net benefits for each
policy level.
4. Search for the tax rate (or standard) that gives
the highest expected net benefit.Abrahams and Shortle Performance of Compliance Measures for Nitrate Nonpoint Pollution Control   87
Results
Results for the expected net benefits from the opti-
mized environmental instruments are presented in
table 3 for two scenarios concerning agricultural
income support programs and two alternative
assumptions about the form of the distribution of
the unknown parameters. In the scenario with the
agricultural income support policies, the expected
net benefit of an optimized instrument is the increase
in the expected social surplus which would result
from the implementation of the instrument given
that the land and commodity markets are distorted
by the income support policies. In scenarios with-
out the agricultural income policies, the expected net
benefit of an optimized instrument is the increase in
the expected social surplus which would result from
implementation of the instrument when land and
commodity markets are not distorted by the income
support policies. The expected net benefits for each
instrument in each scenario are derived using
uniform or normal distributions for the unknown
parameters.
Expected Net Benefits
The expected net benefit of each of the instruments
is substantially greater in the “with” income support
programs scenario for both distributions (table 3).
There are two reasons for this difference. One is that
the agricultural income support programs encourage
fertilizer use, and therefore increase environmental
damage costs relative to the case without the
supports. In other words, there are larger gains to be
had from pollution reductions. The greater fertilizer
use with agricultural income support programs is a
consequence of the increased production resulting
from supporting the producer price above the per-
fectly competitive equilibrium level, and substitution
of fertilizer (and other inputs) for land resulting
from the implicit tax on land created by the Acre-
age Reduction Program.
The second reason for this difference has to do
with the deadweight costs of the income support
programs. The income support programs distort the
output and land markets, resulting in less land use
but more output than would occur in the perfectly
competitive equilibrium. By reducing output and
penalizing fertilizer use relative to other inputs, the
environmental policies reduce the economic costs
of the market distortions in the scenario with the
income support programs. This “extra dividend”
from the environmental policies is not present in the
scenario without income support programs.
In the scenario without income support polices,
the tax instruments produce substantially greater
benefits than the standards, with the tax on excess
nitrogen substantially outperforming the fertilizer
tax. As noted previously, optimized taxes and
standards for any particular base would be equally
efficient in the absence of uncertainty about
polluters’ control costs. Thus, our results suggest
uncertainty about producer responses can be a very
important factor in the choice between price and
quantity controls for nitrate pollution control from
agriculture. Because our model is highly nonlinear
in both endogenous and random variables, the
explanation of the relative performance of the taxes
and standards for each base cannot be reduced to
the differences in the slopes of linear marginal ben-
efit and cost curves offered by Weitzman (1974), or
more recently by Wu (2000), and Wu and Babcock
(2001).
While the relative performance of taxes and
standards for each base is inherently an empirical
question when there is uncertainty about polluters’
control costs, the superior performance of the tax
on excess nitrogen relative to the fertilizer tax is to
be expected a priori in the scenario without income
support policies. In our model, nitrogen pollution is
proportional to excess nitrogen. Excess nitrogen is
in turn equal to nitrogen applications less uptake.
Because uptake is proportional to production, which
is a function of all inputs, fertilizer is not the only
input that affects excess nitrogen. A tax on excess
nitrogen will induce producers to choose the com-
bination of fertilizer and other inputs that minimize
the cost of reducing nitrogen pollution. A tax on
fertilizer will induce responses that minimize the
costs of reducing fertilizer use, but these responses
would be equivalent to least-cost reductions in nitro-
gen pollution only if pollution were proportional to
fertilizer use. Thus, the costs of a pollution reduc-
tion will be greater with the fertilizer tax than with
the tax on excess nitrogen. Our findings show the
difference in the results is substantial.
An interesting feature of our results is that, in the
absence of income supports, a tax on fertilizer sub-
stantially outperforms an excess nitrogen standard.
This again underscores the importance of uncer-
tainty about producers’ control costs for the choice
between instruments. In the absence of uncertainty
about producers’ control costs, the reasoning pre-
sented above would imply an excess nitrogen
standard would outperform a fertilizer tax. How-
ever, in our results, the gains from the use of a tax
on the suboptimal base (fertilizer) greatly outweigh88   April 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 3. Expected Net Benefits (million dollars)
With Support Programs Without Support Programs
Instrument Uniform Normal Uniform Normal
Fertilizer Tax 492.2 397.0 52.5 53.2
Fertilizer Standard 422.4 334.3 0.01 0.01
Excess Nitrogen Tax 470.0 374.7 71.5 71.0
Excess Nitrogen Standard 452.0 368.5 0.01 0.01
the benefits of using an optimal base (excess nitro-
gen) with a standard. Thus, recommendations about
the appropriate base for nitrate and other types of
nonpoint pollution control should not be made
without reference to the type of mechanism used to
induce changes in polluters’ behavior. While taxes
dominate for both bases, the same caution should
be applied to recommendations about the types of
mechanisms used to induce behavioral change.
The relative performance of the instruments in the
scenario with income support policies differs from
the scenario without these programs. The tax option
again substantially dominates the standard for each
base. Thus, uncertainty about polluters’ control costs
remains an important factor, with taxes outperform-
ing standards within a category. However, in this
case, the fertilizer tax dominates the tax on excess
nitrogen. The reason for the change in ranking has to
do with the relative effects of the two instruments on
the deadweight loss associated with the income
support programs. Both instruments, by reducing
total output and the incentives for substituting
fertilizer and other inputs for land, yield an extra
dividend in the form of reduced deadweight costs
from commodity and factor market distortions.
While less efficient as an environmental instrument,
the fertilizer tax has a better overall economic
outcome because it produces a larger reduction in the
deadweight costs of the market distortions. Given the
definition of excess nitrogen, the excess nitrogen tax
is, in effect, a tax on fertilizer less an output subsidy.
The fertilizer tax component will encourage substi-
tution of other inputs for fertilizer, and will have a
negative output effect as a consequence of increased
marginal costs. The output subsidy component will
encourage the use of all inputs. Because the fertilizer
tax has the stronger effect, the net result is to reduce
output and fertilizer use, but to a lesser degree than
the fertilizer tax alone.
Although still dominated by the tax instruments,
the performance of the fertilizer and excess nitro-
gen standards is much better in the scenario with
income supports than without. The difference is the
larger external costs and the extra dividend from
reducing deadweight costs in the scenario with
income support policies.
Conclusion
This analysis has examined the choice between alter-
native instruments for reducing nitrate pollution from
agricultural nonpoint sources. Whereas prior re-
search on the choice of instruments under uncertainty
is almost exclusively conceptual, this analysis is
based on a simulation model that incorporates var-
ious sources of uncertainty and nonlinearities, and
allows us to estimate the expected net benefits from
alternative instruments. The instruments considered
are differentiated according to compliance measures
(nitrate inputs, proxies for nitrate losses to the envi-
ronment) and the types of regulations applied (prices,
quantity controls).
Public uncertainty about economic and environ-
mental outcomes due to imperfect information about
parameters of cost and benefit functions (e.g., input
substitution elasticities, product demand, and input
supply elasticities), and stochastic environmental
variables, is captured by the model by treating the
parameters of interest as random variables with
known distributions.
Because of our interest in linkages between price
and income policies on environmental policy
performance, a simulation model was implemented
at a national level so as to capture the effects of
environmental policies on prices and, in turn, the
deadweight loss of the price and income support
policies. The expected net benefits from the opti-
mized environmental instruments are presented for
two scenarios concerning agricultural income sup-
port programs and two alternative assumptions
about the form of the distribution of the unknown
parameters. The expected net benefit of an optimized
instrument is the increase in the expected social sur-
plus which would result from the implementation of
the instrument under alternative agricultural income
support programs.Abrahams and Shortle Performance of Compliance Measures for Nitrate Nonpoint Pollution Control   89
The results show that economically efficient
nitrate policy choices are sensitive to agricultural
income support programs and uncertainty. Economic
theory indicates that with perfect information, quan-
tity instruments are as efficient as the tax instru-
ments. However, under conditions of uncertainty or
asymmetric information, the performance of quantity
and price instruments is an empirical issue. With
uncertainty, our findings indicate price instruments
give higher expected net benefits than quantity
controls, and are therefore more efficient in the
control of nonpoint source pollution with or without
agricultural income support programs. In the pres-
ence of agricultural income support programs, the
preferred instrument is a fertilizer tax, whereas with-
out the agricultural income support programs, the
preferred policy is an excess nitrogen tax.
Our specific results are clearly contingent on the
structure of our simulation model. The major limita-
tions are the modeling of a single crop, the lack of
spatial detail, and the assumptions regarding
functional forms. Advances in our understanding of
national agri-environmental policies under uncer-
tainty would be achieved by increasing the spatial
resolution, the comprehensiveness of the modeling
of production, and consideration of multiple func-
tional forms. An enormous and obvious challenge
in expanding the analysis is, however, the “curse of
dimensionality.”
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